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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Aiberto Varela-Terna appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence, claiming the district 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Varela-Terna with felony driving under the influence 
("DUI"). (R, pp.10-11, 36-37.) Varela-Terna filed a motion to dismiss, asserting 
"the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest [him] for Driving Under the 
Influence as [his] car was parked in a private residential driveway" and LC. § 18-
8004 "does not include a residential driveway." (R., p.44 (capitalization original).) 
The court conducted a hearing on Varela-Tema's motion (see generally 
10/29/2012 Tr.), after which it made the following findings of fact 
On May 6, 2012, [Varela-Terna] drove his vehicle to his 
friend's trailer home located in a trailer park at 2374 E. Iona Rd. in 
Bonneville County. Entrance to the trailer park is from E. Iona Rd. 
The trailer park has a "L" shaped road which provides access to the 
trailers (and a single "non-trailer" residential home). There are 
approximately 13 trailer homes within the park and each trailer 
home has a driveway with lawn or dirt areas between the trailers 
and adjacent to the driveways. The single road within the trailer 
park is not a through road and does not travel beyond the trailer 
park. 
There is some fencing around the perimeter of the park 
however there is no fence or gate across the access to the trailer 
park. There are no posted signs restricting access to the trailer 
park. There is a posted speed limit of 10 mph and a stop sign for 
vehicles exiting the park. No business is conducted on the 
premises and the park is solely for residential purposes. While 
most of the trailer homes are owned by the residents, the lots are 
leased from the owner of the park. 
1 
In arriving at his friend's trailer, [Varela-Terna] drove his car 
up on to the lawn or dirt next to the trailer inasmuch as other 
vehicles were parked in the driveway. After the vehicle was 
stopped and ~arked, a portion of the vehicle extended into the 
roadway area_,FNJ 
There is no real dispute as to the other circumstances 
leading up to [Varela-Tema's] arrest for DUI. Later that night, 
[Varela-Terna] and his friend were in the vehicle drinking and 
listening to loud music. A neighbor complained to the police about 
the music with the police responding shortly thereafter. As an 
officer approached [Varela-Terna) sitting in his vehicle, he observed 
suspicious movements including [Varela-Terna] quickly sweeping 
something off the seats of the vehicle. As the officer spoke with 
[Varela-Terna], he believed [Varela-Terna] was under the influence 
of alcohol. For purposes of this motion, [Varela-Terna] does not 
dispute that he was intoxicated while in his vehicle. 
[FNJ The evidence on this issue was disputed. The Court makes 
this finding solely for the purpose of determining probable cause 
and the finding is not binding on a jury. 
(R., pp.99-100). 
The court denied Varela-Tema's motion to dismiss, stating: 
This Court finds that the dirt area adjacent to the asphalt drive way 
[sic] is tantamount to a driveway and cannot be considered private 
property open to the public. 
However, as noted above the Court found that the back 
portion of [Varela-Tema's] vehicle extended beyond the dirt into the 
trailer park's roadway. The issue then is whether it makes a 
difference for purposes of applying the statute when the parked 
vehicle is not entirely within the roadway. Under the language of 
the statute, the Court finds that the statute will apply to an 
intoxicated motorist even if a portion of the vehicle is parked on 
private property not open to the public. The policy behind the DUI 
statute should not be considered ineffective simply because a 
portion of a vehicle was off the roadway and on private property. 
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(R., p.103.) The court also concluded the "roadway within the trailer park 
was open to the public, making [Varela-Terna] subject to the DUI statute. 
(R., p.104.) 
Varela-Terna thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to felony driving 
under the influence, reserving the right to appea! the denial of his motion to 
dismiss. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.2, L.4- p.6, L.13; R., pp.81-85.) The court imposed 
a unified eight-year sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.95-98.) Varela-Terna filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.107-109.) 
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ISSUES 
on appeal as: 
1. Should case be remanded for the district court to make a 
finding of fact as to whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the 
road in the trailer park? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Varela's motion 
to dismiss? 
3. Did the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, upon 
Mr. Varela following his plea of guilty to felony DUI? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should the district court have denied Varela-Tema's motion to 
dismiss because Varela-Terna waived preliminary hearing and, therefore, 
waived his right to move to dismiss the charge on the claimed basis it was 
unsupported by probable cause? 
2. Even if this Court considers the merits of Varela-Tema's motion, 
has he failed to show the district court did not make the requisite factual finding 
or otherwise erred in denying his motion to dismiss? 
3. Has Varela-Terna failed to show a unified eight-year sentence with 
two years fixed, with the benefit of retained jurisdiction and subsequent 
placement on probation, constitutes an abuse of discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
This Court Should Affirm The District Court's Denial Of Vareia-Tema's Motion To 
Dismiss On The Basis That Vareia-Tema Could Not Properly Move To Dismiss 
For Lack Of Probable Cause After Waiving His Preliminary Hearing 
"Unless indicted by a grand jury, a defendant when charged in a 
complaint with any felony, is entitled to a preliminary hearing." I.C.R. 5.1 (b). The 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the magistrate to determine, from the 
evidence presented, if "a public offense has been committed and that there is 
probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such 
offense." LC.R. 5.1 (b); see State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 387, 234 P.3d 707, 
711 (2010) ("The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there 
is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony."). "If from 
the evidence the magistrate does not determine that a public offense has been 
committed or that there is not probable or sufficient cause to believe that the 
defendant committed such offense, the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint 
and discharge the defendant." I.C.R. 5.1(c). 
Varela-Terna waived his right to a probable cause determination at a 
preliminary hearing and filed a written acknowledgement, signed by himself and 
counsel, that he understood "the right for, the nature of, and the effect of a waiver 
of a preliminary examination." (R., p.34.) By waiving his right to a preliminary 
hearing, Varela-Terna "waive[d] the right to a probable cause determination 
regarding the charged felony." Stewart, 149 Idaho at 387, 234 P.3d at 711. 
"[H]aving waived his right to a preliminary hearing, [Varela-Terna] admitted the 
existence of sufficient evidence to find that there was probable cause to believe 
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that he committed the crime of felony [driving under the infiuence]." !fl at 388, 
234 P.3d at 712. He was not entitled to re-visit the question of probable cause in 
the district court by filing a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court's opinion in 
Stewart, supra, is on point. 
In Stewart, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a motion to dismiss similar 
to the one filed by Varela-Terna. The state charged Stewart with felony stalking. 
149 Idaho at 385, 234 P.2d at 709. Stewart, like Varela-Terna, waived his right 
to a preliminary hearing but, after he was bound over to district court, he filed a 
motion to dismiss claiming a lack of probable cause based on his interpretation of 
what constituted a "continuing course of conduct" under the felony stalking 
statute. ~ at 385-386, 234 P.3d at 709-710. Although the district court 
addressed the merits of Stewart's motion and ultimately denied relief, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Stewart could not "dispute whether 
there [was] probable cause to believe he committed the felony charged" because 
he "waived his right to a preliminary hearing." ~ at 388, 234 P.3d at 712. The 
Court further noted: 
The Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have a prov1s1on 
comparable to a motion for summary judgment found in the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. A defendant cannot have a case 
dismissed on the ground that the State's discovery responses show 
that it cannot prove the crime charged. The only somewhat 
comparable motion would be a motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not show probable 
cause to believe that the defendant had committed the felony 
charged. Of course, that motion would require that there was a 
preliminary hearing. 
Stewart at 388, 234 P.3d at 712 (citation omitted). 
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Although the district court, citing Stewart, noted that the "[w]aiver of a 
preliminary hearing typical!y precludes the right of a defendant to challenge 
probable, cause," it nevertheless concluded that "[d]espite the questionable 
procedure by which" Varela-Terna challenged the probable cause finding, it had 
"discretion and authority under Rule 48(a)(2), ICR to consider a motion to 
dismiss, make factual findings, and determine whether those facts constitute 
probable cause." (R., pp.101-102.) The district court relied on State v. Martinez-
Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), to support its finding of 
discretion. (R., p.102.) The court's reliance on Martinez-Gonzalez was 
misplaced. 
In Martinez-Gonzalez, the defendant filed a "motion to suppress or 
dismiss, asserting the evidence was obtained pursuant to an illegal traffic stop 
and arrest" 152 Idaho 778, 275 P. 3d at 4. More specifically, Martinez-Gonzalez 
"argued he was arrested under suspicion of DUI on private property not covered 
by the criminal statute and the arresting officer did not have probable cause that 
Martinez-Gonzalez was under the influence of alcohol." kt The district court 
denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. kt at 777, 275 P.3d at 3. 
However, nowhere in the Court's opinion is there any indication that Martinez-
Gonzalez waived his preliminary hearing. 1 More importantly, the Court of 
1 Indeed, this Court may wish to take judicial notice of the Record in Martinez-
Gonzalez, which reveals that there was in fact a preliminary hearing and the 
district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript in resolving 
the motion to suppress or dismiss. Martinez-Gonzalez, Docket No. 37737, R., 
p.51 n.1. Also unlike the present case, Martinez-Gonzalez filed a motion to 
suppress or dismiss, challenging the state's ability to use certain evidence at trial, 
whereas Varela-Terna moved only to dismiss. 
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Appeals in Martinez-Gonzalez did not discuss the scope of discretion under 
I. C.R. 48(a)(2), much less state that the rule creates an exception to the 
Supreme Courts holding in Stewart that waiver of a preliminary hearing 
forecloses the ability to subsequently challenge probable cause for the charge. 
To be sure, if !.C.R. 48 allowed for the discretion exercised by the district court in 
this case, the Court in Stewart would have addressed the merits of the probable 
cause ruling challenged on appeal. Instead, the Court "affirm[ed] the denial on 
the correct theory." 149 Idaho at 388, 234 P.3d at 712 (emphasis added). This 
Court should likewise affirm the district court in this case on the "correct theory" 
that Varela-Terna could not challenge the probable cause for his arrest after 
waiving his preliminary hearing. 
Because Varela-Terna waived his preliminary hearing, he cannot show 
error in the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
II. 
Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Varela-Tema's Claim. Varela-Terna 
Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Remand Or Any Error In The Denial Of 
His Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Varela-Terna "asserts that this case should be remanded for the district 
court to make a finding of fact as to whether his car was upon the road in the 
trailer park." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Alternatively, Varela-Terna argues the 
district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss, because, he claims his 
"conduct was not a crime" since, according to him, "the road within the trailer 
park was not open to the public." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Both of Varela-
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Tema's arguments fail. The record shows the district court made the requisite 
factual finding and review of the evidence presented and the applicable legal 
standards supports the conclusion that the road in question was open to the 
public. If this Court reaches the merits of Varela-Tema's claim, he has failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a 
criminal action for an abuse of discretion." State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 
Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). In reviewing a 
discretionarf decision, the appellate court considers whether the district court ( 1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries 
of discretion and consistent with any applicable legal standards, and (3) 
exercised reason in reaching its decision. 1st 
The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject 
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct 
App. 2011). 
C. Because The District Court Found That Varela-Tema's Car Was Partially 
On The Road, There Is No Need To Remand This Case For A Finding 
Whether Varela-Tema's Car Was "Upon" The Roadway 
The state charged Varela-Terna with driving under the influence in 
violation of I.C. § 18-8004, which reads, in relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances . . . to drive or be in 
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actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether 
upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public. 
I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). 
At the hearing on his motion to dismiss, Varela-Terna admitted he was 
sitting in the "driver's side" of his car when law enforcement arrived and that he 
was "pretty drunk."2 (10/29/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-24, p.12, Ls.17-18.) Officer 
Joshua Fielding confirmed that Varela-Terna was sitting in the "driver's position" 
and that the car was running. (10/29/2012 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-25.) The only element 
of the DUI charge Varela-Terna disputes is whether his car was "upon public or 
private property open to the public." (R, p.44; see generally Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-18.) With respect to this claim, Varela-Terna claims, for the first time on 
appeal, that the district court did not "make a finding of fact regarding whether the 
car was upon the road," and requests this case be remanded for that purpose. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The record disproves Varela-Tema's claim. 
In its Order on Motion for Dismissal, the court made the following finding 
of fact: "a portion of the vehicle extended into the roadway area." (R., p.100.) In 
that same order, the court later stated: "as noted above the Court found that the 
back portion of [Varela-Tema's] vehicle extended beyond the dirt into the trailer 
park's roadway." (R., p.103.) In the order's conclusion, the court reiterated: 
Varela-Tema's "vehicle was in the trailer park's roadway." (R., p.104.) 
Varela-Terna acknowledges the foregoing finding and conclusion of the 
district court but nevertheless argues the court "did not make a finding of fact as 
2 Varela-Tema's blood alcohol content was .212. (10/29/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-
16.) 
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to whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the road within the trailer park, i.e., that the 
car was touching and being supported by the top surface of the roadway." 
(Appe!lant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Vare!a-Tema's argument is based solely on 
semantics. That the court used a word other than ''upon" to find that Varela-
Tema's car was on the roadway is not legally significant and it in no way supports 
a claim that the court failed to make a factual finding on the only issue that was 
disputed. Indeed, the factual finding Varela-Terna claims the district court did not 
make was the necessary predicate to the court's subsequent analysis of 
"whether the parking lot of the trailer court is to be considered as private property 
open to the public."3 (R., p.103.) Varela-Tema's claim that the district court did 
not make a factual finding regarding the positioning of Varela-Tema's car fails 
because it is belied by the record. His request for remand should be denied. 
D. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Varela-Tema's Motion To 
Dismiss Despite The Fact He Waived His Preliminary Hearing, Varela-
Terna Has Failed To Show A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support His 
Arrest For Driving Under The Influence 
Varela-Terna contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss because, he argues, "Officer Fielding lacked probable cause that a crime 
was being committed as to the 'upon public or private property open to the public' 
element of the DUI statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) More specifically, Varela-
3 Even if the court did not explicitly find Varela-Tema's car was partially on the 
road, such a finding was implicit in the court's decision and may be considered 
by this Court on appeal. See State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 757 P.2d 240 
(Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he failure of the trial court to make findings of fact, when 
ruling on a suppression motion, does not automatically constitute reversible error. 
Where, as here, there has been no request for findings by either party under 
I.C.R. 12(d), our Supreme Court has stated that we should examine the record to 
determine the 'implicit' findings which underlie the judge's order."). 
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Terna asserts "the road within the trailer park was not open to the public." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Application of the law to the evidence presented 
supports the district court's contrary conclusion. 
For purposes of the DUI statute, "private property open to the public" 
means "real property not owned by the federal government or the state of Idaho 
or any of its political subdivisions, but is available for vehicular traffic or parking 
by the general public with the permission of the owner or agent of the real 
property." LC.§ 49-117(16); State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 479, 974 P.2d 1105, 
1108 (1999) (holding definitions from Title 49 apply to DUI statute), abrogated on 
other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 
889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011 ). The Court in Martinez-Gonzalez, "clarif[ied] the two 
steps necessary to determine if private property is 'open to the public' for 
purposes of Idaho's DUI state." 152 Idaho at 784, 275 P.3d at 10. "First, the 
private property must be 'available for vehicular travel or parking by the general 
public."' J.s:l (quoting LC. § 49-117(6)) (emphasis omitted). "[T]he general public 
does not mean everybody is welcome on the property all of the time, but simply 
means an indefinite and undefined group of people." Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 
Idaho at 785, 275 P.3d at 11 (citing State v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 256, 258, 881 
P.2d 551, 553 (Ct. App. 1994)). Factors relevant to this step of the analysis 
include "whether the property is business or residential and whether the area is 
immediately accessible from a public sidewalk or street." Martinez-Gonzalez at 
785, 275 P.3d at 11. If the property is a parking lot in a residential complex, the 
court should consider "the size of the complex and whether the location is a 
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common area." id. "Size and capacity of a residential complex is of 
consequence because the larger the complex, the mom its users grow to an 
indefinite and undefined group and the iess control a singie resident can exercise 
over the common area." & 
The second step in the analysis is whether the property is "available to the 
public 'with the permission of the owner."' Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 785, 
275 P.3d at 11 (quoting I.C. § 49-117(16)). "The intent of the owner is evaluated 
by observing limitations to access, such as the presence of physical barriers, 
posted signs restricting the types of users, and whether there are expressed 
consequences for entry." Martinez-Gonzalez at 785, 275 P.3d at 11 (footnote 
omitted). 
The district court recited the foregoing factors and concluded the roadway 
at issue was open to the public, emphasizing "the absence of any restricted 
access." (R., p.104.) The court also found that each trailer within the park had 
its own driveway, there were "no posted signs restricting access," "[t]here is a 
posted speed limit of 10 mph and a stop sign for vehicles exiting the park," and 
"[w]hile most of the trailer homes are owned by the residents, the lots are leased 
from the owner of the park." (R., pp.99-100.) The evidence also showed that the 
road is "immediately accessible" from a public street. (Exhibits A, B and 3.) 
These factors support the district court's conclusion that the road on which part of 
Varela-Tema's car was parked was public property open to the public. 
Varela-Terna claims otherwise, noting "the road within the trailer park did 
not give access to a business" and "[t]he small scale of the trailer park also 
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indicates that the road within the trailer park was not available for vehicular travel 
or parking by the general public." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) These factors do 
not tip the balance in Varela-Tema;s favor. Vv'hiie there is no separate business 
such as a bar or a mall inside the trailer park, the trailer park is itself a business 
in that the lots are leased from the owner of park. (R., p.100.) In fact, there is a 
sign posted that advises: "All new tenants must sign in with the manager before 
moving in." (Exhibit 4 (capitalization altered).) Certainly any member of the 
public interested in leasing a lot from the manager would be free to drive and 
park on the road either to look at the property or to speak to the ma·nager. 
Vvith respect to the size of the trailer park, the court found "[tJhere are 
approximately 13 trailer homes" (R., p. 99) and there was evidence that the park 
also includes one residential non-trailer home, which is the manager's house 
(10/29/2012 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-18; Exhibit A). Contrary to Varela-Tema's 
arguments, the size of the park does not support a finding that access to the 
public was limited or restricted - especially in the absence of any signage 
reflecting such an intent by the owner. In fact, it would not be readily apparent to 
a motorist that the road on which Varela-Terna was parked was different than 
any other residential road through a neighborhood, especially given the L-shaped 
configuration of the road through the trailer park. (Exhibit A.) Varela-Tema's 
claim that the district court erred in concluding the road was open to the public 
fails. 
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Because the district court made the necessary factual finding and did not 
abuse its discretion in determining the road through the trailer park was open to 
the public, Varela-Terna has faiied to establish any basis for remand or reversal. 
111. 
Varela-Terna Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencina Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Varela-Terna asserts his sentence is "excessive considering any view of 
the facts, because the district court did not adequately consider evidence of [his] 
substance abuse problems." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts of this case show Varela-Terna has failed to establish 
the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Varela-Terna Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Imposing A Unified Eight-Year Sentence With Two Years Fixed For 
Felony Driving Under The Influence 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the 
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burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho 
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears 
necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id. 
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court 
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest." kl 
Varela-T ema has been convicted of driving under the influence on at east 
four prior occasions4 and he was on probation for felony driving under the 
influence when he committed his current offense. (3/11/2013 Tr., p.57, Ls.5-6.) 
Varela-Terna has had numerous opportunities for probation, but continues to 
drink and drive. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Given Varela-Tema's history, he cannot establish 
that an eight-year sentence with two years fixed is excessive. Varela-Terna 
argues otherwise, claiming the court did not "adequately consider evidence of 
4 The presentence report reflects four prior DUI convictions (PSI, pp.4-5); 
however, the prosecutor indicated at sentencing that Varela-Terna has "two more 
DUl's, one from '95 and '94" which appeared to be omitted from the PSI due to 
different spellings of Varela-Tema's last name (3/11/2013 Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53, 
L.20, p.57, Ls.1-12). 
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[his] substance abuse problems." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) The record 
contradicts this claim. 
In sentencing Vareia-Tema, the district court expressly recognized Vare!a-
Tema has "an alcohol problem" and granted Vare!a-Tema·s request for retained 
jurisdiction so he could obtain some treatment but was ultimately, and justifiably, 
concerned about the need to protect society from Varela-Tema's repeated 
criminal behavior. (3/11/2013 Tr., p.59, Ls.4-8, p.60, Ls.1-6.) The court also 
gave Varela-Terna another chance at probation at the conclusion of the retained 
jurisdiction review period. (Retained Jurisdiction Order of Probation, filed August 
8, 2013 (augmentation).) Unsatisfied, Varela-Terna claims "adequate 
consideration of [his] substance abuse problems should have also led to a lesser 
underlying sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) To the contrary, the court gave 
Varela-Tema's substance abuse more consideration than it was due. As 
explained by the Idaho Supreme in State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d 
387, 392 (2007), the defendant's "serious alcohol problem" did not require a 
reduction in his sentence for felony driving under the influence. Rather, a 
defendant's history of alcohol abuse and crimes related thereto "show the proper 
exercise of discretion," not an abuse of discretion claimed. 1J:L That Varela-
Terna believes his alcohol problem should have resulted in a lesser sentence 
does not establish an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Varela-Tema's 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 24th day of December, 2013. 
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